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WITTGENSTEIN ON WAR AND PEACE1
In the title of this essay there is an immediate echo of Leo Tolstoy’s 
famous novel. However, before taking this Russian writer as the leitmotiv 
for my point of view, I will make some comments about the legitimacy of 
using the notes, letters, diaries, conversations and testimonies of the author 
of the Tractatus as a basis for reconstructing what he thought about this 
matter, since the texts by him that were published or intended to be pub-
lished do not enable us to do so. Luigi Perissinotto has urged this caution 
concerning the use of private texts in the case of religion.2 With regard to 
war and peace, or pacifism, the question is even thornier because we do 
not even have notes for his classes, or all the remarks about religion that he 
jotted down in On Certainty, for example.
All the same, I think it is legitimate to reconstruct Wittgenstein’s 
thoughts about war by commenting on texts of this kind because, in the 
first place, I consider that philosophy is an authorial genre. To put it in the 
terms used by Michel Foucault in Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur, I think that phi-
losophy is a genre in which the “author function” is of fundamental impor-
tance – as in the case of literature – as opposed to those texts – scientific or 
administrative texts, for example – in which authorship is erased, silenced 
or concealed. This dichotomy, admittedly, has not always had the same 
content in the course of history, or even in our cultural tradition. However, 
the fact is that since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries scientific 
discourses have been accepted and appreciated for their own sake, whereas 
literary discourses are always associated with their author. What we find 
in the first case is a concatenation – deductive or of some other kind – of 
truths that can be demonstrated or re-demonstrated and that form a system 
in which there is no reference to authors (at most, they appear by giving 
1 This article forms part of the work of the research project Culture and Religion. 
Wittgenstein and the Counter-Enlightenment, FFI 2008-00866 FISO.
2 See Perissinotto, L., Croire sans prevue. Wittgenstein et la religion, “Esprit”, vol. 
391, 2013, pp. 81-97.
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their name to a theorem or a pathological symptom or an experiment, etc.). 
On the other hand, with any literary text, nowadays we ask: Who wrote it? 
When and how? What led him or her to do so? With what intention? And 
the reception of the text has depended – and still does, to a large extent – 
on the answers to such questions. Philosophy is a special case because, 
since classical antiquity, it has been a genre in which the importance of the 
author is absolute. Perhaps what became known as analytic philosophy of 
language was one of the points in which the emulation of scientific knowl-
edge was such that its authorial nature was blurred by the prominence of 
certain blocks of themes. In general, however, the kind of questions that are 
posed with regard to literary texts are also valid for philosophical texts. At 
any rate, in the authorial mode of considering texts the biographical aspects 
of the author form a substantial part of his or her significant intentions and 
therefore – although not exhaustively – of the interpretation.
Secondly, however, I consider that Wittgenstein’s conception of philoso-
phy is completely in accordance with many of the assumptions underlying 
the authorial consideration of a text. There are many passages in which 
Wittgenstein considers philosophy as “work on oneself”, as an exercise in 
self-understanding leading to a dimension that is both descriptive (one’s 
way of seeing things) and valorative (what one expects of them).3 Philoso-
phy is a personal urgency so closely related to oneself that it can be com-
pared to the discomfort of an itch (and we all have our itches). Therefore, 
philosophical reflection cannot be considered cumulatively, as an imper-
sonal progress, like the constructive nature of scientific knowledge.4 So the 
exercise of philosophy has to do with one’s personal temperament, because 
that is what determines the similes, metaphors or parables that one selects 
and that distinguish certain philosophies from others,5 and also the attitude 
that one adopts: precipitate or else patient and painstaking, in other words, 
3 Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, Blackwell, Oxford 1998. [1931, #84] “Work 
on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more work 
on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one 
expects of them.)”
4 Ivi, [1950, #490] “Philosophy hasn’t made any progress? – If someone scratches 
where it itches, do we have to see progress? Isn’t it genuine scratching otherwise, 
or genuine itching? And can’t this reaction to the irritation go on like this for a 
long time, before a cure for the itching is found?”
5 Ivi, [1931, #106] “If it is said on occasion that (someone’s) philosophy is a 
matter of temperament, there is some truth in this. A preference for certain 
comparisons (Gleichnisse) is something we call a matter of temperament & far 
more disagreements rest on this than appears at first sight.”
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rigorous.6 But it also depends on one’s moral virtues and sensibility. In 
the 1930 Foreword to his book Philosophische Bemerkungen, Wittgenstein 
declares that he would like to say that the book is written to the glory of 
God. However, since such a statement would be misunderstood in our age, 
he explains that “It means the book is written in good will” and that in so 
far as it is not so written “but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to 
see it condemned”. The identification between book and author is such that 
he ends the foreword with an assurance that “He cannot free it of these 
impurities further than he himself is free of them”.7 So that, before attain-
ing a more or less general understanding, a person who philosophises must 
concern himself with his own logical and moral mistakes, confusions, dis-
comforts and uneasinesses.8 Only in this way can the philosopher attempt 
to persuade some people to see things in another way, from another point 
of view, without any assurance of success.9 Taking for granted that this 
personal activity of understanding, of oneself and of the world, will not 
be received universally, but only by those who have a certain cultural and 
moral, that is, existential rapport with the person who has practised it. In 
the oft-quoted “Sketch for a Foreword” for the Philosophische Bemerkun-
gen, Wittgenstein considers the receivers of his book as a circle of “friends 
scattered throughout the four corners of the world”. Now, the basis for this 
“friendship” is a “common sympathy”; in other words, his book will be un-
derstood by those who share his feeling against “the direction of European 
civilization”, whose goals Wittgenstein says he does not understand. He 
deliberately emphasises that for him this common feeling does not consti-
tute a judgement value, and he underlines the degree to which his personal-
ity forms part of his philosophy and its reception.10 He does not consider 
this circle of recipients to be an elite, nor – once again – does he think that 
6 Ivi,[1939, #179] “In philosophy the winner of the race is the one who can run most 
slowly. Or: the one who gets to the winning post last.”
7 Id., Philosophical Remarks. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, p. 7.
8 Id., Culture and Value, op. cit. [1944, #254] “The philosopher is someone who 
has to cure many diseases of the understanding in himself, before he can arrive at 
the notions of common sense.” [1944, #252] “Thoughts at peace. That is the goal 
someone who philosophizes longs for.”
9 Ivi, [1947, #356].
10 “This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it is 
written. This spirit is, I believe, different from that of the prevailing European and 
American civilization. The spirit of this civilization the expression of which is the 
industry, architecture, music, of present day fascism & socialism, is a spirit that is 
alien & uncongenial to the author. This is not a value judgement.” Id., Culture and 
Value, op. cit. [1930, #29], p. 8.
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they are better or worse than others; if he addresses himself to them it is 
because they share a cultural affinity, they share a familiarity, as immedi-
ate as it is diffuse, like the relationship sensed by “fellow countrymen”, in 
comparison with whom others are felt to be “foreign”.11 Therefore, a very 
important part of the reception of this philosophical thinking and of the un-
derstanding of its dynamics – of a person’s particular “Denkbewegungen” 
– is bound up with the key features of his biography, with the tastes, fears 
and obsessions and with the spiritual life of the person who has experi-
enced them. With regard to Wittgenstein’s constant worry about not being 
understood, Drury tells us that when he was working on the second part of 
the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein said to him: “It is impossible 
to say in my book one word about all that music has meant in my life. How 
then can I hope to be understood?”12
However, to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical thinking it is nec-
essary not only to refer to the biographical aspects and testimonies provid-
ed by his private writings. It is also necessary to include in his philosophy 
how he tackled matters that cannot be included in – if we use the usual 
academic headings – logic, epistemology, the philosophy of language, and 
so on. It is also necessary to include in his philosophy matters that have to 
do with both private and public life; in other words, how he thought about 
himself in relation to the political community. A letter that he wrote to Nor-
man Malcolm clearly indicates this conception of philosophy, the central 
focus of which never ceased to be the search for the meaning of life – of his 
life – in the variety of manifestations that it adopted for someone so obses-
sively reflective about his identity. Malcolm tells us that in October 1939 
he argued with Wittgenstein about a headline in the German press that ac-
cused England of having tried to kill Hitler with a bomb. Wittgenstein, 
who thought the headline looked plausible, became angry when Malcolm 
contradicted him and said he considered the British to be too “civilized and 
decent”, that such an act was too incompatible with the British “national 
character” for it to be true. The importance that Wittgenstein attributed to 
11 “If I say that my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if that can be 
called a circle) I do not mean to say that this circle is in my view the élite of 
mankind but it is the circle to which I turn (not because they are better or worse 
than the others but) because they form my cultural circle (mein Kulturkreis), as 
it were my fellow countrymen (gleichsam die Menschen meines Vaterlandes) in 
contrast to the others who are foreign to me.” (1931) Id., Culture and Value, op. 
cit., pp. 12–13.
12 Drury, M.O’C. “Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in Rhees, 
R. (ed.) Ludwig Wittgenstein. Personal Recollections, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1981, p. 94.
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this argument is shown by the fact that he came back to the matter in a let-
ter five years later, confessing to Malcolm that whenever he thought about 
him he could not help thinking about that argument, because he had been 
shocked by his “primitiveness” and it had led him to think:
what is the use of studying philosophy if all that it does for you is to enable 
you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., 
& if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of eve-
ryday life, if it does not make you more conscientious than any … journalist 
in the use of the DANGEROUS phrases such people use for their own ends. 
You see, I know that it’s difficult to think well about ‘certainty’, ‘probability’, 
‘perception’, etc. But it is, if possible, still more difficult to think, or try to 
think, really honestly about your life & other people lives. And the trouble is 
that thinking about these things is not thrilling, but often downright nasty. And 
when it’s nasty then it’s most important.13
*
So much for the justification of approaching my theme by looking at pri-
vate testimonies and texts. In this regard, however, I can already make one 
substantive statement about the matter that concerns me. Wittgenstein’s 
reflection is neither political nor sociological; rather, he thinks of war as 
an especially important opportunity in his search for the meaning of life, 
considering it, therefore, from an ethical and religious viewpoint. This does 
not prevent his viewpoint from being free of the political implications that 
we might suggest now.
The fact that the young Wittgenstein considered the first great European 
war of the twentieth century as an opportunity for his spiritual development 
can be glimpsed in the testimony of his sister, Hermine. Despite the double 
hernia that would have exempted him from military service, Wittgenstein 
insisted on enlisting, not only to defend his country but also because he 
felt “an intense desire to take something difficult upon himself and to do 
something other than purely intellectual work.”14 That he did not criticise 
or become disenchanted with this “war Bildung” is confirmed by the testi-
mony provided by Brian McGuinness and Norman Malcolm, and also by 
Drury. Many years later, talking about his experience of war to a nephew 
whose viewpoint was of a pacifist hue, he said that “It saved my life; I 
13 Wittgenstein, L. “Letter to Malcolm dated 16-11-44”, in Malcolm, N. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. A Memoir, . Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 93-94.
14 Wittgenstein, H. “My Brother Ludwig”, in Rhees, R. (ed.) Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Personal Recollections, op. cit., p. 3.
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don’t know what I’d have done without it.”15 As for Malcolm, he reports 
that, when he complained in a letter at the end of the Second World War 
about the boredom of being mobilised in a warship, Wittgenstein replied 
that he had never been bored and he had not disliked his army service. 
Furthermore, in his letter of reply Wittgenstein compared war to a school. 
If a pupil says that school is boring it is because he is incapable of learning 
what is taught at school:
… I can’t help believing that an enormous lot can be learnt about human 
beings in this war – if you keep your eyes open. And the better you are at think-
ing the more you’ll get out of what you see. For thinking is digesting…but the 
fact remains that if you’re bored a lot it means that your mental digestion isn’t 
what it should be. I think a good remedy for this is sometimes opening your 
eyes wider.16
To help him to consider the fighting as an opportunity for learning about 
himself and others, he recommended that Malcolm should read Tolstoy’s 
short story Hadjí Murat, of which he says in a later letter “I hope you’ll 
get a lot out of it, because there’s a lot in it.”17 Lastly, I shall cite Drury’s 
testimony. When Wittgenstein visited him in his quarters in 1940, at the be-
ginning of the Second World War, Malcolm complained about his colonel’s 
clinical incompetence. Drury says that Wittgenstein “gave him a lecture” 
on the importance of discipline and obedience to superiors in war.18 Witt-
genstein reminded him that nobody joins up in order to have a good time in 
the army and Drury says that his impression was that he was really speak-
ing about his own experiences in the previous war.
Now, for Wittgenstein the search for the meaning of life, in relation to 
the war, pivots on two intensely felt subjective experiences: fear of death 
(which sometimes takes the form of fear of madness)19 and the experience 
of obedience, of self-discipline. I shall relate these considerations to his 
experience of war, but I think that many of their elements remained ever 
15 McGuinness, B. Wittgenstein. A Life, Duckworth, London, p. 204.
16 Malcolm, N. Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir, op. cit., p. 50.
17 Ivi, p. 117.
18 Drury, M.O’C., op. cit., p. 159.
19 “If in life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health of our understanding 
by madness.” Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, [1944, #255], op. cit., p. 50. 
There are many biographies – and passages in Wittgenstein – that emphasise his 
constant fear of going mad.
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afterwards, shaping the religious point of view from which he could not 
help considering any problem.20
So, soon after the war began, in the entry for 7.10.1914 in the so-called 
“secret diaries”, that is, the diary entries that were written in code, we read:
I don’t yet understand how to do my duty simply because it is my duty, or 
to reserve my entire person for the life of the spirit. I may die in an hour, I may 
die in two hours, I may die in a month or not for a few years. I can’t know and 
I can’t do anything about it one way or the other: that’s how life is. How then 
ought I to live in order to hold my own at that moment? To live amid the good 
and the beautiful until life stops of itself.21
In this entry there is a connection between the notion of “doing one’s 
duty”, the feeling of the possibility of imminent death (and also of the 
anticipation of future death) and the idea of a good life, which is expressed 
here as living “amid the good and the beautiful”. This connection runs 
through all the secret diaries, with more or less emphasis. On 4 May 1916 
he notes:
Tomorrow perhaps I shall be sent out, at my own request, to the observation 
post. Then and only then will the war begin for me. And – possibly – life too! 
Perhaps nearness to death will bring light into my life. May God enlighten me. 
I am a worm, but through God I become a man. God be with me. Amen.
Five days later he concludes emphatically: “It is only death that gives 
life its meaning.”22
Thus “nearness to death” provides an opportunity to examine the mean-
ing of life, to succeed in glimpsing the beginning of a new life, a “resurrec-
tion” (the “beginning” of the war may be the beginning of “life”): “Now I 
should have the chance to be a decent human being, for I’m standing eye 
to eye with death”,23 he says after his first experiences of combat. And this 
search for meaning has a religious dimension, it is bound up with God, 
with whose assistance he says he can transform himself from an animal to 
a human being. As in Tolstoy, incidentally, although I cannot go into that 
20 “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious 
point of view”. Drury, M.O’C., op. cit., p. 94.
21 Wittgenstein, L. Diarios secretos, Edición de Wilhelm Baum. Madrid, Alianza 
Universidad, 1991, pp. 65–67.
22 Id., Diarios secretos, pp.147–149.
23 Id., Diarios secretos, 15 September 1914, p. 55.
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now.24 I think that Wittgenstein never abandoned this connection between 
death, meaning and religious point of view which was forged in the war.
Moreover, for Wittgenstein as for Tolstoy, fear of death is the criterion 
for determining the mistakenness of the life one is leading or has led. And 
Wittgenstein was afraid of death.25 On 6 May 1916 he notes: “In constant 
danger of death … From time to time I become disheartened. This is the 
school of the false conception of life …!”, and on 29 July of the same year 
he is even more explicit:
“Yesterday I was shot at. I was scared! I was afraid of death. I now have 
such a desire to live. And it is difficult to give up life when one enjoys it. This 
is precisely what ‘sin’ is, the reasoning life, a false view of life. From time to 
time I become an animal. Then I can think of nothing but eating, drinking, and 
sleeping. Terrible! And then suffer like an animal too, without the possibility of 
internal salvation. I am then at the mercy of my appetites and aversions. Then 
an authentic life is impossible.26
Sin is seen here as pure inertia in living, instinctively clutching to life 
without worrying about what each individual can and must accomplish 
in it, in accordance with his stature. Years later he said to Malcolm that 
the measure of the greatness of a man is found in what his work demands 
of him,27 and one has only to read his war diaries to perceive the torment 
produced in him by the question of having or not having the spiritual state 
of mind that would allow him to work. All the same, this “state of sin” has 
a psychological translation. In the same period as the entries just quoted, 
he says: “I am still living in sin, in other words, unhappily. I am in a bad 
mood, without happiness. I am living in discord with everything around 
me.”28 So that putting himself in God’s hands, submitting to his will – “thy 
24 I have discussed this in “Muerte y religión: del Tolstói maduro al joven 
Wittgenstein”, Logos. Anales del seminario de Metafísica, nº. 45, 2012.
25 Much has been said to the effect that Wittgenstein himself declared after the 
war that he had joined up as a volunteer in order to seek death. For example, 
W. Baum, the editor of the secret diaries (/Geheime Tagebücher/, Turia and 
Kant, Vienna, 1991), in a footnote to the entry for 15 April 1916 of the Spanish 
edition. However, I think that his confrontation with death has the religious and 
moral sense to which I have alluded; I believe that all the courageous acts that he 
performed, and his efforts to get sent to dangerous positions on the front (see H. 
Wittgenstein, “My Brother Ludwig”, art. cit., op. cit., p. 5), must be interpreted 
thus, not as an absence of fear.
26 Id., Diarios secretos, p. 155.
27 Malcolm, N. Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir, op. cit., p. 61.
28 Wittgenstein, L. Diarios secretos, op. cit., 11 August 1916, p. 157.
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will be done” is an expression repeated almost obsessively in the Secret 
Diaries – is a condition for inner peace and happiness. In response to the 
question “But how to arrive at inner peace?” he answers “ONLY if I lead 
a life pleasing to God! Only then is it possible to endure life”;29 “May God 
improve me! Thus I shall also be more contented”,30 “May God keep me in 
a cheerful state of mind!”31
This psychological concomitant of a good life, or, if you prefer, a life that 
is honest from an ethical point of view32 or genuine from a religious point 
of view,33 explains his rejection of nihilism in connection with his reading 
of a volume of Nietzsche’s works which included The Antichrist. Wittgen-
stein thinks that there is some truth in Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity. 
And after saying that “Certainly, Christianity is the only sure way to hap-
piness”, he asks why one should not spurn that happiness; and whether it 
would not be better to perish unhappy in a hopeless struggle against “the 
external world”.34 For him, such a life is without meaning, but why not lead 
a meaningless life? Wittgenstein does not answer his own question about 
whether such a life would be unworthy, but he declares that that life would 
be unhappy for him, without content or joy. He thought a great deal about 
this question. Although he does not answer the question about why one 
should not lead a meaningless life at this point, he does so two years later in 
his Notebooks (1914–1916). He says there that “again and again” he comes 
back to the idea that “simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad” and 
that the further question of why one should live happily seems to him of 
itself “to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified, of 
29 Id., Diarios secretos, op. cit., 6 May 1916, p. 149.
30 Ibid., my emphasis.
31 Id., Diarios secretos, 6 August 1916, p. 157, my emphasis.
32 I think that it is from this perspective that we must interpret statement 6.422 in the 
Tractatus: “The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form ‘thou shalt 
…’ is: And what if I do not do it. But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with 
punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the consequences 
of an action must therefore be irrelevant. At least these consequences will not be 
events. For there must be something right in that formulation of the question. 
There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must 
lie in the action itself. (And this is clear also that the reward must be something 
acceptable, and the punishment something unacceptable.)” My emphasis. 
Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Cosimo Inc., New York, 2009, 
pp.105–106.
33 “What is Good is Divine too. That, strangely enough, sums up my ethics.” [1929, 
#20] Id., Culture and Value, op. cit., p. 5.
34 Id., Diarios secretos, op. cit., 8 December 1914, p. 109.
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itself, it seems that it is the only right life”.35 In any case, in 1914, in answer 
to the question “What must I do then so that my life will not be lost?” he 
replies “I must always be conscious of it – always conscious of the spirit”.36
Years later, at the start of the Second World War, Wittgenstein came 
back to the same idea but with a non-religious phraseology: the challenge 
in life is not the absence of fear, but mastering it in order to have a coura-
geous attitude, on which a meaningful life depends:
Not funk but funk conquered is what is worthy of admiration & makes life 
worth having been lived. Courage, not cleverness; not even inspiration, is the 
grain of mustard that grows up to be a great tree. To the extent there is courage, 
there is connection with life & death.37
*
But a courageous attitude also depends on strengthening the spirit 
(Geist) in order to live amid the good and the beautiful, the only way of 
“holding one’s own” against the fear inspired by death and the animal life, 
reduced to pure instinct that it encourages. To the extent that even dying 
loses its terrible quality. This is what he says in 1937, in perfect accord with 
his wartime meditations:
The horrible instant in an unblessed death must be the thought: ‘Oh if only 
I had… Now it’s too late.’ Oh if only I had lived right! And the blessed instant 
must be: ‘Now it is accomplished!’ But how must one have lived in order to tell 
oneself this! I think there must be degrees here too.38
At the height of the 1914–18 war, Wittgenstein would not have admitted 
“degrees”, his challenge was more radical and his ethical/religious demands 
less benevolent. This radicalness had to do with his spiritual transforma-
tion, for, from an ethical and even physical point of view, not losing his life 
depended on being “always conscious of the spirit”, on strengthening it.
Now it is not easy to disentangle the semantic field of the term “spirit”, 
practically absent from the writings intended for publication (it appears 
35 Id., Notebooks, 1914–1916. University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 78.
36 Id., Diarios secretos, op. cit., 8 December 1914, p. 109.
37 Id., Culture and Value, op. cit. [1940, #208], pp. 43–44. The sentence written in 
italics is in the original text.
38 Wittgenstein, L. “Movements of Thought: Diaries, 1930–1932, 1936–1937”, 
in James C. Klagge, Alfred Nordmann (eds.): Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and 
Private Occasions, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham (MA), 2003, p. 185 [176].
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once in the Philosophical Investigations), whereas Wittgenstein uses it 
profusely in his private writings, especially in what has been known as the 
secret diaries and the Notebooks (1914–1916), in Movements of Thought: 
Diaries 1930-1932, 1936-1937 and in Culture and Value.39 In one of its 
senses, “spirit” is the most radically characteristic nucleus of each person. 
On one occasion Wittgenstein summed it up as “character and will”.40 But 
it also includes the creative potential, the intellectual virtues, moral sensi-
bility, that in which I recognise myself most intimately and to which I al-
ways aspire; an ego ideal, if we were to express it in Freudian phraseology. 
All of which includes the particular cultural component (Kultur) in which I 
participate and in which I have been brought up and which, therefore, sub-
sumes the canon of the great works of art, but also a certain idea of social 
organisation, at least in its more general features.41
For Wittgenstein, therefore, the “spirit” that must be strengthened and 
that must strengthen him and help him to live decently inasmuch as it in-
volves a mastery of himself – of his “appetites and aversions”, his instincts 
and passions42 – is invoked in very different ways, depending on whether 
he is alluding to its personal or transpersonal dimension. Sometimes he 
wishes it were stronger (“Oh, if only my spirit were stronger!!!”) so that 
it might help him in his weakness (“I am a weak person, but the spirit 
helps me”); sometimes it gives him the necessary manly courage to face 
danger (“Cowardly thoughts, frightened hesitations and womanish com-
plaints don’t change the wretchedness, They don’t make you free!”);43 the 
spirit is also where one takes refuge when physical penury and emotional 
malaise are pressing (then “one turns towards the spirit”, or it is “inside 
me countering my depressions”);44 something that must be cultivated with 
total dedication, that makes him free because it disengages him from ex-
39 See Sanfélix, V. “Una filosofía del espíritu. Wittgenstein y la cuestión judía”, in 
Mariano Rodríguez (ed.), La mente en sus máscaras, Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid, 
2005.
40 “As I can infer my spirit (character, will) from my physiognomy, …” Wittgenstein, 
L. Notebooks, 1914–1916, op. cit., entry for 15/10/1916, p. 229.
41 The text that follows continues the quotation in note 10: “Culture is like a great 
organization which assigns to each of its members his place, at which he can work 
in the spirit of the whole, and his strength can with a certain justice be measured 
by his success as understood within that whole.” “Sketch for a Foreword” to the 
Philosophische Bemerkungen, Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, [1930, #29], 
op. cit., p. 39. 
42 See note 26.
43 Wittgenstein, L. Diarios secretos, op. cit., 20 February 1915, p. 127.
44 Id., Diarios secretos, op. cit., 20 October 1914, p. 75.
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ternal contingencies and shelters him (“So long as the spirit is alive! It is 
the safe harbour, set apart from the desolate, endless grey sea of events”).45 
Wittgenstein attributes a divine quality to the spirit because it is a condition 
of the good life: “To believe in a God means to understand the question 
about the meaning of life,” he declares in the Notebooks,46 a thoroughly 
Tolstoyan affirmation, to be sure.
The term “spirit” that appears in the war diaries certainly has a Tol-
stoyan affiliation. Wittgenstein himself says so the first time that “spirit” 
appears in the secret diaries, soon after he joined up. Fearing that he might 
not do his duty properly under fire, he said to himself: “Over and over 
again, inside myself, I repeat Tolstoy’s words: ‘Man is weak in the flesh but 
free in the spirit.’ Would that the spirit were in me!”47 And four days later 
he emphasises that it is “only through it” that man is free.48 And, indeed, in 
Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief – the famous book that Wittgenstein bought 
in a bookshop in Tarnów and carried around with him constantly – the 
subtitle of chapter I is “Man, the son of God, is weak in the flesh but free 
in the spirit” [Der Mensch ist ein Sohn Gottes, ohnmächtig im Fleische und 
frei durch den Geist].
The fact that Tolstoy was a lasting influence on Wittgenstein is beyond 
doubt and deserves a detailed study for which there is no space now. But 
that influence is due to a reading not only of The Gospel in Brief but also of 
his literary work, especially the popular tales and Hadji Murat, the reading 
of which he recommended throughout his life.49 He told Drury that only 
two European writers had had anything important to say about religion in 
recent times: Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. He recommended the latter’s The 
Brothers Karamazov and Crime and Punishment, and Tolstoy’s traditional 
stories published in English as Twenty-Three Tales. When they met again 
Drury told him that he preferred Dostoyevsky to Tolstoy and Wittgenstein 
disagreed, declaring that Tolstoy’s short stories would always survive and 
that the one he liked best was “The Three Hermits”.50 Similarly, Malcolm 
insists that Wittgenstein did not like Resurrection, the great novel of Tol-
45 Id., Diarios secretos, op. cit., 13 December 1914, p. 111.
46 Id., Notebooks, 1914–1916, op. cit., entry for 8/7/1916, p. 209.
47 Id., Diarios secretos, op. cit., 12 September 1914, p. 53.
48 Id., Diarios secretos, op. cit., p. 55. My emphasis.
49 I have discussed Wittgenstein’s lifelong fixation with this novel by Tolstoy in “La 
virtud moral de las alegorías. Wittgenstein y Hadjí Murat”, in Marrades, J. (ed.) 
Wittgenstein. Arte y Filosofía, Plaza y Valdés, Madrid, 2012.
50 Drury, M.O’C., op. cit., p. 100. However, Bertrand Russell’s impression in 1919 was 
the opposite: “But on the whole he likes Tolstoy less than Dostoewski (especially 
Karamazov).” Letter to Lady Ottoline 20/12/1919, in Brian McGuinness (ed.) 
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stoy’s final period, but that he very much liked the short stories because he 
considered that Tolstoy’s philosophy is “most true when it’s latent in the 
story” (which was not the case with Resurrection). In Malcolm’s case, the 
story he was commenting on was “How Much Land Does A Man Need?”51 
Moreover, Engelmann – who met Wittgenstein in 1916 when he was trans-
ferred to an officers’ school in Olmütz after being promoted to sergeant and 
decorated with the Medal for Bravery – tells of their conversations about 
religion in which they talked about Tolstoy’s story “Two Old Men”. All 
this is true, but despite the fact that the notion of “spirit” in Wittgenstein 
has a Tolstoyan affiliation, and that they both attribute a divine quality to 
the spirit, and that Tolstoy’s influence on Wittgenstein’s religious thinking 
goes beyond the explicit, all this does not mean that there is a total coin-
cidence between them; especially with regard to war, peace and pacifism, 
which is what we are talking about now.
Because the core of Tolstoy’s religious thinking is that, going beyond 
all superstitious rituality, true religion can be summed up in the maxim 
that “loving God is simply loving one’s fellow man”, which is spelt out in 
five laws or commandments to confront and overcome the corresponding 
temptations. Five laws, three of which insist on the same point:
The first (Matt. v. 21–26), that man should not only do no murder, but not 
even be angry with his brother, should not consider any one worthless: ‘Raca,’ 
and if he has quarrelled with any one he should make it up with him before 
bringing his gift to God – i.e., before praying. […] The fourth (Matt. 38–42), 
that man should not only not demand an eye for an eye, but when struck on one 
cheek should hold out the other, should forgive an offence and bear it humbly, 
and never refuse the service others demand of him. The fifth (Matt. 43–48), that 
man should not only not hate his enemy and not fight him, but love him, help 
him, serve him.52
This is the conclusion of Resurrection, in which Tolstoy refers to the 
Sermon on the Mount in the Gospel according to St. Matthew. And Tolstoy 
made this point of view a banner that he constantly displayed publicly. He 
expounded the doctrine of non-violent resistance to evil, resulting from his 
religious thinking, in many of his writings, such as The Kingdom of God 
Is Within You, What Is Religion?, The Slavery of Our Times, and in many 
Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911–1951, Wiley-Blackwell, 
Chichester, 2012, p. 112.
51 Malcolm, N. Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir, op. cit., pp. 52 and 59.
52 Tolstoy, L. Resurrection, translated by Mrs Louise Maude. Pennsylvania State 
University, 2000, pp. 616–617.
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articles of journalism or agitation, such as “Thou Shalt Not Kill” or “The 
False Doctrine of the State” and many others. His appeals for non-violence, 
for deserting the army, for not answering the call-up or for disobeying or-
ders were so constant, and Tolstoy’s fame in this regard was so extensive, 
not only in Europe but further afield, that the adoption of non-violence by 
Ghandi – who contacted Tolstoy – was due to his reading of “A Letter to a 
Hindu”, written in 1908, in which the Russian writer recommended non-
violence as a way of freeing India from British colonialism; and also to his 
reading of The Kingdom of God Is Within You, a book in which Tolstoy set 
out to rescue all those who defended non-violence from oblivion.
It is impossible that Wittgenstein should not have known this aspect of 
Tolstoy and the central importance that he attributed to it in a morality that 
had an immediate political dimension. However, Wittgenstein was never a 
pacifist, as indicated by the testimonies already cited. He was certainly not 
a pacifist at the height of the 1914–18 war. In this respect, Engelmann’s 
recollections are enlightening. When they met in 1916, Engelmann had 
already abandoned the militaristic exhilaration that had swept the whole 
of Europe at the beginning of the war. He had even collaborated with an 
early pacifist, Karl Kraus, collecting newspaper cuttings so that the latter 
could write his play The Last Days of Mankind, which is possibly the work 
that formally best expresses the collapse of European order because of the 
absurdity of the war. As for Wittgenstein, Engelmann says that he had “a 
complete different opinion [from his own] … He considered his obligation 
to go to the war as something that he had to fulfil in any circumstance”.53
Now it has to be said that there was not just one pacifism but various 
pacifisms of very different kinds. There were pacifisms such as that of the 
poet Siegfried Sassoon at a certain point,54 which simply expressed his 
disagreement with the way in which the Allied General Staff was conduct-
ing the war without being bothered about the mass slaughter resulting from 
obsolete conceptions of war and clumsy strategic and tactical decisions. 
There were pacifisms that many people thought were simply a covert na-
tionalist mobilisation, such as the cases of Barbusse and his novel Le Feu 
or, on the other side of the trench, Erich Maria Remarque and his Im Westen 
nichts Neues. There were also pacifisms whose rejection of the war sought 
a final class war, a long civil war that would wind through the whole of 
Europe and put an end to capitalism, the cause and reason of all wars; this 
53 Engelmann, P. Wittgenstein-Engelmann, Cartas, Encuentros, Recuerdos, Pre-
Textos, Valencia, 2009, p. 125.
54 Sassoon, S. Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, Faber and Faber, London, 1974.
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was the case with members of the left who had Bolshevik leanings, such 
as Ernst Friedrich and his famous illustrated book War against War! or 
the Walter Benjamin of Einbahnstraße. This kind of warlike pacifism, if 
you will forgive the oxymoron, prospered in the interwar period, as Stefan 
Zweig relates in his account of the failure of the Clarté project, a group 
intended to include writers and artists with the aim of opposing all enmity 
between nations. Apart from the immense difficulties brought about by the 
Treaty of Versailles, what killed off the project and made Zweig abandon 
it was Barbusse’s move to the USSR after writing his novel Le Feu; he 
had become convinced that universal brotherhood could not be achieved 
by bourgeois democracies and he wanted to convert Clarté into “an instru-
ment of class struggle”.55 But there were also pacifisms that made no con-
cessions, such as those of Zweig himself or those descended from Tolstoy, 
to give two examples.
Now, Wittgenstein rejected even Engelmann’s sophisticated pacifism. 
Engelmann felt antipathy for the pacifism that was displayed in neutral 
countries, in other words, countries that did not feel involved in the ex-
treme situation being experienced by the combatants (and the populations 
engaged in war). He thought that those displays “would only be serious if 
they led to opposing war activity with an equally serious action, one that 
was equally dangerous personally”. Therefore he agreed with the view of 
some British courts with regard to conscientious objectors: the accused 
should prove that throughout his life he had behaved in a way “that made 
it legitimate for him to place religious obligation above obligation to the 
State”; only in those circumstances was he allowed to perform “an (equally 
dangerous) service without weapons”. Engelmann considered, therefore, 
that his subjective opposition to war did not excuse him from his “obliga-
tion” to the State. He also did not share the opinion maintained by one kind 
of pacifism that existed then (like Tolstoy’s, incidentally); namely, that hu-
man life “is the greatest of all possible goods in any circumstance”; he 
“only felt that there are higher goods, but that it is forbidden to annihilate 
life for the sake of something less valuable than the supreme goods”.56 At 
any rate, in his notes he refers to war as “mass murder” and declares that 
after the stabilisation of the fronts in 1915 he realised that he “had to devote 
55 Zweig, S. The World of Yesterday, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln (NE), 
1964, p. 306.
56 Engelmann, P., Wittgenstein-Engelmann, Cartas, Encuentros, Recuerdos, op. cit., 
pp. 124-125.
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all my life to the service of a single thing = to try to shorten the duration of 
the mass murder”.57
In contrast to Engelmann, Wittgenstein argued that his obligation was 
to go to the war in any case. Engelmann adds that there was no possibility 
of any compromise between their respective points of view. But the in-
teresting thing is how Wittgenstein considered his companion’s particular 
pacifism: it was an “honest” attitude because it derived from a profound 
conviction, even “more honest although no more meaningful” than that 
of a “militant pacifist” or that “of the martyrdom … of a conscientious 
objector”.58 Of Bertrand Russell he thought the same, it was an honest posi-
tion – because of his conviction and because he had risked going to prison 
– but an inappropriate one. Ilse Somavilla cites the testimony, reported 
by Brian McGuinness, that Wittgenstein condemned Bertrand Russell’s at-
tendance at a meeting for Peace and Freedom after the war. When Russell 
said to him “Well, I suppose you would rather establish a World Organiza-
tion for War and Slavery,” Wittgenstein replied, “Yes, rather that, rather 
that!”59 Somavilla comments that Wittgenstein did not consider that war 
was better than peace, but he thought the preaching of peace more insin-
cere than the war. I do not believe that his rejection was just a question of 
sincerity or hypocrisy. Wittgenstein had no doubt, for example, about the 
sincerity of Engelmann’s desire for peace. What is more important, for an 
understanding of his disagreement, is the different perception that they had 
of what the duty of an honest man worthy of living a genuine life was. But 
“duty” is a concept that needs clarification here, because I think that in 
Wittgenstein generational elements are mixed with a very personal elabo-
ration of an ethical and religious nature.
I shall dwell on this aspect that I have called “generational”. In an excel-
lent book about the cultural history of what preceded the First World War, 
and about its development and what came afterwards, Rites of Spring, The 
Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, Modris Eksteins provides an 
analysis – based on personal diaries, private correspondence, etc. – of the 
differences between the use of the term Duty by the British and French 
combatants, on the one hand, and that of Pflicht – which is the word Witt-
genstein uses in his war diaries – among the Austro-German soldiers. In 
one letter, after days of being in the mud, being bombarded, resisting the 
assaults of the French infantry, etc., a soldier called Gerhart Pastors writes:
57 Id., Wittgenstein-Engelmann, Cartas, Encuentros, Recuerdos, p. 203.
58 Ibid.
59 Loc. cit. note nº 1, p. 204
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You become strong. This life sweeps away violently all weakness and sen-
timentality. You are put in chains, robbed of self-determination, practiced in 
suffering, practiced in self-restraint. But first and foremost: you turn inward. 
The only way you can tolerate this existence, these horrors, this murder, is if 
your spirit is planted in higher spheres. You are forced into self-contemplation, 
you have to come to terms with death. You reach, to find a counterweight for 
the ghastly reality, for that which is most noble and highest.60
This letter might have been written by Wittgenstein. Eksteins quotes nu-
merous letters by soldiers written in the same vein which I cannot include 
here, but I will sum up what he concludes. The important thing in the no-
tion of duty (Pflicht) for the Austro-German combatants was being ready 
to make a sacrifice, not the purpose of the sacrifice. The notion of Pflicht 
went beyond the defence of the fatherland because, among other reasons, 
there were many lands in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Above all, it had 
a powerful subjective element, made up of willpower and personal honour. 
An honour which requires that personal inspiration and initiative and tem-
perament be put to the test. Therefore the will is the way of giving specific 
form to honour and it is experienced as a creative force. Another soldier 
wrote in a letter: “…the stronger [a person] he is, the more he obeys.” As 
Eksteins says, concealed behind this notion of duty there is the metaphysi-
cal assumption that death regenerates, and that was the reason for the popu-
larisation of the expression “die heilige Pflicht”, “sacred duty.” Quoting 
Eksteins:“Horror was turned into spiritual fulfillment. War became inner 
peace. Death, life.”61 Once again, this expression could be applied to Witt-
genstein.
All Wittgenstein’s war diaries show a connection between the possibil-
ity of immediate death, the notion of “doing one’s duty (Pflicht)” and the 
ideal of a life lived amid the good and the beautiful. Ten days after he start-
ed reading Tolstoy’s gospels, in the first entry in which he uses his reading 
of it, after the quotation “Man is weak in the flesh but free in the spirit” 
Wittgenstein goes on writing, “How shall I behave if they start shooting? 
I’m not afraid of being killed by a shot, but I am afraid of not doing my 
duty (Pflicht) properly. May God give me strength! Amen, Amen, Amen.”62
Now, despite what has been said, I think that one can and cannot iden-
tify Wittgenstein with a generation at this point. Yes, in the sense that the 
60 Eksteins, M. Rites of Spring, The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, 
Anchor Book –Doubleday, New York, 1990. See pp. 193 ff.
61 Ibid.
62 Wittgenstein, L. Diarios secretos, op. cit., 12 September 1914, p. 53.
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combatants in the Great War had an experience that cannot be compared 
with any other and that, as Ilse Somavilla says with regard to Wittgenstein 
and Engelmann, “moved them very deeply and changed them for ever”.63 
Yes, in the sense that I have tried to show by commenting on the notions 
of duty, obedience and self-discipline. The more general conceptions of 
his youth undoubtedly had a family resemblance to those of many young 
combatants in his social environment. In another sense, however, Wittgen-
stein’s response is particular because of its religious configuration and its 
apolitical nature in a period – which, once again, has been considered by 
recent historiography as a European civil war – when it was not easy, and 
was certainly a minority reaction, to abstain from the political extremes 
that soon appeared in the post-war period.
Because, despite the situation in which he found himself, Wittgenstein 
thought that unhappiness came from an imbalance between himself and 
how life was, but at the same time he considered that it was his duty to 
acknowledge that it was not life that was to blame for this imbalance but 
how he was. It is evident that a different attitude would have been possi-
ble, such as that of his friend Engelmann and many others: devoting one’s 
energy to changing the circumstances of life as it is in order to rectify the 
imbalance that is the origin of unhappiness. For Wittgenstein, however, 
religiousness was, in fact, a recognition of that imbalance, which he al-
ways kept in sight as a spur to making moral demands on himself, without 
excusing his conduct because of external circumstances. He rejected the 
possibility of considering that the facts that circumscribed his life should 
be altered because it was in that given reality that it was his duty to show 
that his spirit (in a personal sense) measured up to the demands of the Spirit 
(in a different, transpersonal sense). Because the freedom that strength of 
spirit gives is for distancing oneself from the world and its contingencies 
(“A human being should not depend on chance. Neither on favourable nor 
on unfavourable chance”),64 in order to make oneself independent not only 
of things but even more of people (“It is easier to be independent of things 
than of people. But one must also manage to achieve this!”).65 The desire 
for a good life – always lived in a fragile, precarious equilibrium – consist-
ed in doing one’s duty for duty’s sake without any utilitarian calculation, in 
63 Somavilla, I. “Paul Engelmann y Ludwig Wittgenstein. Penas existenciales y 
búsqueda apasionada”, in Engelmann, P., op. cit., p. 309.
64 Wittgenstein, L. Diarios secretos, op. cit., p. 65.
65 Id., Diarios secretos, op. cit., p. 43.
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doing things well and being indifferent66 to the contingencies of the world 
in order to achieve peace of spirit and be able to work on logic (which, in 
turn, constitutes a contribution to the life of the spirit in so far as the spirit 
has a cultural objectification). All of which was foreshadowed when Witt-
genstein said that in order to hold one’s own in the vicissitudes of a life that 
could cease at any moment one had to live amid the good and the beautiful 
until life ended. For aesthetic and ethical consideration have to do with 
seeing an object or the world (respectively) sub specie aeternitatis, in other 
words, they consist in seeing from outside, not in being among them.67
*
Wittgenstein’s lack of historico-political perspicacity is not surprising. 
Engelmann described the moral demand that war made on him as the im-
perative of devoting his life to a single aim, “to try to shorten the duration 
of the mass murder”. The expression “mass murder” is not innocuous. It 
reveals the grasp of a fundamental feature of technological warfare that 
appeared in the 1914–18 conflict and since then has not abandoned our 
age: the ability to kill en masse and from a distance as a result of the de-
velopment of weapons that no longer point at individual bodies but sweep 
abstract spaces, annihilating everything that they contain, resources, cities, 
combatants and non-combatants. The Great War introduced what General 
Ludendorff called “total war”. However, there is not a single entry or com-
ment by Wittgenstein about this feature of contemporary warfare. “Mass 
murder” is an expression foreign to his way of referring to the war, because 
he continues to think of it in terms of the obsolete image of a duel, as a per-
sonal challenge that he has to measure up to. But a peculiar duel, because 
he embodies both duellists.
It is true that there are some notes and comments – after the Second 
World War – which express a socio-political consideration of the new na-
ture of war. In 1945, just after the end of the fighting, he says quite plainly 
that the end of the war does not fill him with joy because he cannot help 
thinking that peace is only a truce, that it is a fabrication of propaganda to 
think that a future war could only break out because of those who are now 
defeated.68 Similarly, the distant, sceptical tone with which he refers to 
66 “My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions 
without meddling with them.” Id., Culture and Value, [1929, #16], op. cit., p. 4.
67 Cf. Id., Notebooks, 1914–1916, op. cit., entry for 7.10.1916, p. 227.
68 “Perhaps I ought to feel elated because the war is over. But I’m not. I can’t help 
feeling certain that this peace is only a truce. And the pretence that the complete 
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the victory celebrations is significant.69 In 1947 he notes that after infinite 
misery the progress of science and industry will succeed in shaping a world 
“in which to be sure peace is the last thing that will then find a home. For 
science & industry do decide wars, or so it seems.”70 And it is precisely 
this conviction that explains his – only apparently – provocative remarks 
about the Atomic Bomb. Perhaps this is his most profound comment about 
the new nature of war, which, incidentally, had already appeared in the 
war in which he fought. In any case, it is not a comment with a pacifist 
sensibility. Not even in this context of extermination of the civilian popu-
lation does he use any expression close to the “mass murder” used by his 
friend Engelmann in regard to the 1914 war. Wittgenstein speaks of the 
“hysterical fear” of people in general and describes those who “are making 
an outcry” or who are “now making speeches against the production of the 
bomb” as “philistines” and “dregs of the intelligentsia”.71 We may suppose 
that at least part of those philistines includes the pacifist and disarmament 
movements that emerged after the apocalyptic end of the war in Asia. It is 
not that Wittgenstein was a defender of the Bomb, but he cannot resist the 
idea that there is something good in the fear and anguish inspired by the 
scenario ushered in by Hiroshima, which he considers “bitter medicine”. 
The pathology that this expeditious remedy had to cure was the uncritical 
confidence in science, the “bedazzlement” produced by “the idea of Great 
Progress”.72 For “the bomb creates the prospect of the end, the destruction 
of a ghastly evil, of disgusting soapy water science”;73 so that it does not 
seem to him foolish to think that “the scientific & technological age is the 
beginning of the end for humanity” and that the humanity that strives for 
the progress of scientific knowledge “is falling into a trap”.74
In other words, Wittgenstein’s criticism of the Bomb as a culmination 
and summing up of industry – governed by the far from altruistic principle 
of profit –, together with science and technology, all conceived in accord-
stamping out of the ‘aggressors’ of this war will make this world a better place 
to live in, as a future war could, of course, only be started by them, stinks to 
high heaven &, in fact, promises a horrid future.” Wittgenstein, L. “Letter to N. 
Malcolm”, in Malcolm, N., op. cit., p. 117.
69 “Rhees … is here & I see a good deal of him. – We’ve had two VJ [Victory over 
Japan] days & I think there was much more noise than real joy.” Id., “Letter to 
Norman Malcolm”, in Malcolm, N., op. cit., p. 116.
70 Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, [1947, #364], op. cit., p. 72.
71 Ivi, p. 56.
72 Ivi, p. 64.
73 Ivi, p. 56.
74 Ivi, p. 64. 
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ance with the abstract principle of accumulation,75 is based on the well-
known Kultur/Zivilisation opposition that developed in the German-speak-
ing world during the nineteenth century. It is not possible to understand his 
criticism about this matter without referring to the famous draft foreword 
for Philosophische Bemerkungen and the related Culture and Value apho-
risms that I cited earlier. It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein uses this op-
position from 1929 almost until the 1950s; in other words, until a very late 
date, when this schema had already fallen into disuse. However, although 
it is true that the genesis of this conceptual opposition covers the whole of 
the nineteenth century – as studied meticulously by Norbert Elias in his 
well-known book The Civilizing Process76 – it is no less true that it was 
reactivated powerfully, with a sense of defence of the cultural particularity 
of Germany, during the 1914 war. Practically the whole of the “cultural 
war” against France and England revolved around the defence of Kultur 
against Zivilisation. Examples are the so-called “Manifesto of the Ninety-
Three”, Aufruf an die Kulturwelt, or Thomas Mann’s article “Gedanken im 
Krieg” (Novembre 1914) and Reflections of an Unpolitical Man; hundreds 
of other examples could be added.
I am not saying at all that Wittgenstein was a German nationalist. In 
fact, in his Secret Diaries he says, at the beginning of the conflict, that the 
thought that “the German race” – he declares himself to be “completely” 
German – was inevitably going to be beaten by the English, “the best race 
in the world”, “depresses me terribly”.77 (Which is really rather curious, be-
cause Wittgenstein was fighting against the Russians on the east front, not 
against the British.) But I am saying that using that conceptual opposition 
75 Ivi, p. 9: “Our civilization is characterized by the word progress. Progress is its 
form, it is not one of its properties that it makes progress. Typically it constructs. 
Its activity is to construct a more and more complicated structure. And even 
clarity is only a means to this end & not an end in itself.” This fragment begins 
an assertion by Wittgenstein that the typical scientist of this civilisation does 
not understand his “spirit”, in the same way that in the planned foreword for the 
Philosophische Bemerkungen he says that he views the direction of European 
civilization “without sympathy and without understanding for its goals, if indeed 
it has any”.
76 Elias, N. The Civilizing Process, Blackwell, Oxford, 1969 and 1972.
77 Wittgenstein, L. Diarios secretos, op. cit., 25 October 1914, p. 77. In 1940, when 
there was fear about the invasion of England and the Blitzkrieg was at its height, 
he confessed to Drury: “You have often heard me speak of my dislike of many 
features of English life. But now that England is in real danger; how I would hate 
to see her destroyed.” Drury, M.O’C., op. cit., p. 159.
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and subscribing to one of its poles (Kultur) involved him in a conception 
of culture that declined in the 1930s.
Sensing that he was far from the feeling of the great movement of Eu-
ropean and American civilisation, whose spirit (Geist) he found “uncon-
genial” (unsympathisch), Wittgenstein did not conceal what the cultural 
affiliation of his own feeling was:
I often wonder whether my cultural ideal is a new one, i.e. contemporary, or 
whether it comes from the time of Schumann. At least it strikes me as a con-
tinuation (Fortsetzung) of that ideal, though not the continuation that actually 
followed it then. That is to say, the second half of the 19th Century has been 
left out. This, I ought to say, has happened quite instinctively & and was not 
the result of reflection.78
Precisely for this reason, and despite his later socio-political comments 
about the war, I think that Wittgenstein never stopped thinking about it 
from the heroic perspective – Romantic in origin – with which he viewed 
it in his youth.
78 Id., Culture and Value, [1929, #17], op. cit., p. 4.
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